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Regional Equality and National Development in China: Is there a Trade-Off? 
 
Abstract: 
Despite high economic growth over the past 30 years, China’s substantial and persistent 
regional disparities have been the subject of continuing concern to policy makers, as well 
as the target of a wide variety of policies.  An important issue in the policy debate about 
whether and how best to attack these disparities is whether measures designed to improve 
regional equality come at a cost to national development, i.e. whether there is a trade-off 
between the level of national output and the equality of its distribution across the regions.  
There is little analysis of this issue in the literature.  We help fill this gap by setting up a 
two-region  model  designed  to  capture  some  of  the  salient  features  of  the  Chinese 
economy.  We subject this model to a number of policy shocks and assess the effects on 
regional disparities in per capita output, on the one hand, and on aggregate output on the 
other to investigate the trade-off.  We also consider income and welfare as alternatives to 
output.  We find that disparities in per capita output, income and welfare often move in 
different directions so that it is important to specify which disparity is being targeted.  
Moreover, since both disparities and aggregate outcomes are endogenous, how they move 
together depends on the nature of the shock driving the model.  Thus, some policies 
designed to reduce disparities face a trade-off and others do not. Only a reduction in 
internal migration restrictions unambiguously reduces all three disparity measures and 
increases  aggregate  output,  income  and  welfare.  All  other  policies  considered  face  a 
trade-off in at least one dimension.    
(265 words) 
Key words: regional disparities, China, national output, trade-off, numerical modelling 
JEL classifications: O18, O23, R11, R12, R13   
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1. Introduction 
That aggregate growth in China has been high for several decades is well known.  
Even the recent “Global Financial Crisis” has had relatively little impact, with China 
being a central engine for world economic growth in the face of faltering economies 
around  the  globe.    What  is  perhaps  somewhat  less  well  known  is  that  the  regional 
distribution of Chinese prosperity has been very uneven and is likely to continue to be so 
for the foreseeable future.  This dark underside of the Chinese “economic miracle” has 
not gone unnoticed by Chinese policy makers at the highest level and central government 
policy to address this issue has been a continuing feature of macroeconomic policy.
1 
Policy to reduce regional disparities are clearly desirable on the basis of equity 
and have also been supported on the basis of the danger of social unrest which might be 
caused by widening gaps between rich and poor regions.  Yet, there has been a noticeable 
caution in the vigour with which such policies are pursued by policy makers who are 
reluctant to jeopardise the continuation of a high aggregate growth rate.  Thus, there is, in 
some quarters at least, a perception that directing policy to improve regional equality may 
have a cost in terms of lower national performance; that is, there is the perception of a 
trade-off between national output and the equality of its distribution across the regions. 
If there is such a trade-off, it is clearly an important constraint on the execution of 
policy.  Yet there has been little analysis of this issue either at a theoretical or empirical 
level.  This is not surprising since the resolution of the question is not likely to be simple; 
after  all,  in  any  reasonable  macroeconomic  model  inter-regional  per  capita  output 
disparities  and  aggregate  output  will  both  be  endogenous  so  that  whether  they  move 
                                                 
1 See Groenewold et al. (2008), Chapter 2 and 3 for detailed information on Chinese regional disparities 
and regional policy since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.  
  4 
together or not will, in general, depend on the nature of the shock driving the model.  In 
policy terms, we would expect the existence of a trade-off to depend on the policy being 
used  to  pursue  equality.    If  this  is  indeed  the  case,  it  is  all  the  more  important  to 
investigate this issue since some policies may be constrained by a serious trade-off while 
others may not. 
Of course, those familiar with the literature on economic development and on  
regional development in particular, will realise that the consideration of such a trade-off 
is not new.  Indeed, it dates back at least to the work on the inverted-U curve between 
economic development and regional inequality; see particularly Williamson (1965) and 
earlier work by Kuznets (1955) and Myrdal (1957) and Hirschman (1958).  The idea 
captured by the inverted-U curve is that in the early stages of development regional (and 
other) inequality rises but eventually falls as development (usually measured in terms of  
income or output per capita) proceeds.  There is thus a relationship between inequality 
and development which has an inverted-U shape.  A recent discussion by Golley (2007, 
Chapter  2)  develops  the  relationship  between  these  papers  and  explores  possible 
underlying mechanisms. 
While  the  original  literature  focused  on  the  relationship  between  (per  capita) 
output or income and disparities, many of the empirical applications came from growing 
economies.  Moreover, policy applications were also often to growing economies so that 
in more recent literature the question is often cast in terms of the relationship between 
growth and inequality.
2  A substantial theoretical and empirical literature has developed 
in this area but little consensus has been reached.  Thus theoretical analysis in papers by 
                                                 
2 But see Chang and Ram (2000) and Easterly (2007) for recent examples of analyses of the relationship 
between per capita income and inequality.   
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Galor and Zeira (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and 
Benhabib  and  Rustichini  (1996)  present  arguments  that  growth  and  inequality  are 
negatively related while Kaldor(1956), Benabou (1996), Edin and Topel (1997) argue the 
opposite effects.  Empirical work is equally inconclusive with the work reported in papers 
by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) finding that inequality is 
harmful for growth while Forbes (2000) reports the opposite finding and various papers 
present ambiguous results including those by Barro (2000), Partridge (2005), Fallah and 
Partridge(2007), Chambers (2007), Bjornskow (2008) and  Barro (2008). 
The literature on inequality and development in China is relatively sparse.  Li and 
He (2006) recently predicted that China will continue to maintain rapid economic growth 
during the 11
th Five-Year plan  but that the income gap between regions will be further 
enlarged  because  of  three  factors:  continuing  structural  adjustment,  the  deepening  of 
administrative  reforms  and  the  enhancing  of  market  forces.    Kuijs  and  Wang  (2005) 
argue that China can have a more balanced growth path with a sustainable reduction of 
income  inequality  if  appropriate  policies,  such  as  reducing  subsidies  to  industry  and 
investment,  encouraging  the  development  of  the  services  industry  and  reducing  the 
barriers  to  labour  mobility  are  implemented.    Wan  et  al.  (2006)  explicitly  tested  the 
growth-inequality nexus in China, focusing on rural-urban income inequality and regional 
growth using a provincial-level panel data set. They found that an increase of inequality 
has negative effects on growth irrespective of time horizons.  Finally, Qiao et al. (2008) 
find that fiscal decentralisation has resulted in more rapid economic growth accompanied 
by greater regional inequality.   
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To sum up, there is a substantial literature, both theoretical and empirical, in the 
broadly-defined area of inequality and development but no consensus on the direction of 
the  relationship  between  them.    Moreover,  there  is  relatively  little  work  which  deals 
explicitly with China. 
Our paper contributes to filling this gap.  Our contribution to the literature is four-
fold.  First, we revert to the original question of the relationship between inequality and 
(per capita) output in contrast to much of the literature which has focused on the growth 
of output.  Second, we extend the analysis from one of output to include income and 
welfare.  We are thus able to look at inter-regional inequality and national development in 
terms of three alternative measures: output, income and welfare.  Third,  we focus on 
inter-regional disparities rather than household income or urban-rural inequality.  This 
reflects, in part at least, an important policy focus in China.  Fourth, we recognise the 
joint endogeneity of the two variables: the inter-regional gap and the national level of 
output (or income or welfare).  This approach is in contrast to much of the empirical 
literature  which  tends  to  consider  causation  from  inequality  to  growth  or  output  and 
ignores the possibility of reverse causation.  Our analysis follows arguments by Lundberg 
and  Squire  (2003)  that  a  two-way  relationship  between  these  variables  ought  to  be 
entertained.     
Our approach is theoretical and we proceed by setting up a simple theoretical 
economic model which we subject to a variety of shocks designed to simulate policy 
actions.    We  then  observe  the  effects  on  both  inter-regional  disparities  and  national 
variables to assess the trade-off question.   
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To  keep  the  analysis  tractable,  we  distinguish only  two  regions  (based  on  the 
widely-used interior/coastal distinction in China), we allow inter-regional migration but 
with a cost to reflect the Chinese household registration or hukou system and we capture, 
in  a  rudimentary  way,  some  of  the  features  of  the  Chinese  taxation  and  expenditure 
system.  Naturally, we abstract from many other features of the economy.   
Notwithstanding  the  simplicity  of  the  model,  it  is  non-linear  and  relatively 
intractable so that, before using it to address the trade-off question, we linearise it in 
terms of proportional changes and go on to solve it in numerical form, calibrating the 
linearised model using recent data for China.  Our model can, therefore, be seen as a 
(very) small computable general-equilibrium (CGE) model, but one which, in contrast to 
commonly-used CGE models, is relatively transparent. 
While the model is designed to capture some features of the Chinese economy and 
is calibrated with Chinese data, we argue that with some exceptions (such as a relaxation 
of the internal migration restrictions) many of the policies simulated are more widely 
applicable than just to China. 
The  structure  of  our  model  is  most  closely  related  to  three  recent  theoretical 
papers on China which use numerical models, one by Hu (2002), one by Hertel and Zhai 
(2006)  and a  third  by  Whalley  and  Zhang  (2007).   While  all these  papers  use  small 
numerical models of (aspects of) the Chinese economy, none of them focuses on policy 
measures  which  might  be  used  to  reduce  regional  disparities  and,  moreover,  none 
addresses the trade-off question. 
The general nature of our findings can be briefly summarised as follows.  First, 
different gaps (i.e. in per capita output , income or welfare) do not generally all move in  
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the same direction so that policy needs to be clear as to which gap is being targeted.   
Second,  whether a narrowing of the gap between the interior and the coast comes at the 
expense of the national level of the relevant variable depends on the policy shock which 
drives the change.  Third, whether there is a trade-off or not depends on the variable of 
interest.  Fourth, most policies face a trade-off in at least one of the three dimensions 
examined.   
 
2. The model 
To keep the regional structure of the model as simple as possible, we assume that 
there are two regions conventionally called the coastal and interior (or inland) regions. 
This two-region scheme has been widely used in policy discussion until the mid-1980s 
and  continues  to  be  widely  used  in  empirical  work  on  China.
3       The  two-region 
disaggregation we use is illustrated in Figure 1.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
The  coastal  region  is  relatively  wealthy  compared  to  the  interior.  Moreover, 
agriculture which has been central to the Chinese economy is still a major source of 
income and employment in the inland provinces while its importance has been supplanted 
by manufacturing in the coast.  We capture these stylised facts starkly by assuming a poor 
interior region (denoted by I) which produces agricultural goods (denoted by A) and a 
wealthy coastal region (denoted by C) which produces manufactured goods (denoted by 
M).   
                                                 
3 Recent papers using this classification are Fleisher and Chen (1997), Demurger(2001), Fujita and Hu 
(2001), Bao et al., (2002), Brun et al. (2002), Hu (2002), Whalley and Zhang (2007) and He, Wei and Xie 
(2007).  
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Each region has households, firms and regional governments.  There is also a 
central  government.    Households  supply  labour  to  firms  which  produce  output.  
Households receive wage and profit income which they use to purchase some of each 
region’s  output;  in  addition,  they  receive  a  government-provided  consumption  good 
which is private in the rival sense.  Firms produce output using three factors – labour, a 
fixed factor  (land  or capital)  and a  government-provided  public  good  (which  we call 
infrastructure).  No factors are inter-regionally mobile in the short run but labour can 
migrate between regions in the long run although there are migration restrictions.  In 
principle, it would be straightforward to introduce capital mobility but this would make 
the interpretation of the results more complicated and distract from our focus on labour 
migration,  governments  and  relative  price  changes  as  connections  between  regions.  
Besides,  there  is  recent  evidence  (Li,  2009)  that  capital  mobility  between  China’s 
provinces is much lower than is consistent with free capital mobility.     
We  distinguish  between  central  and  regional  governments,  with  the  latter 
including all sub-national government levels although we recognise that, in practice, the 
latter level includes several layers (provincial, prefecture, county and township).  This 
distinction between two levels of government is an important part of our model since 
both regional and central governments can be expected to implement policies which have 
regional objectives and effects.   
In our model, both levels of government provide households with a consumption 
good.  From the households’ perspective the government-provided consumption good is 
homogeneous.    In  addition  to  the  consumption  good,  the  regional  governments  are 
assumed to provide infrastructure which is an input into the production process.   
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On the taxation side, we  assume three taxes in the model in a way which broadly 
reflects the stylised facts of the Chinese taxation system: (i) a national value-added tax 
(VAT), the rate for which is set by the central government at the same level for both 
regions and the proceeds from which are shared between the central government and the 
regions with the same shares for each region;
4 (ii) a business tax levied by the coastal 
government which is assumed to be levied on the value of manufacturing output; (iii) an 
agricultural tax which we assume to be levied on the value of agricultural output by the 
interior government.
5      
We  assume  that  households  supply  labour  inelastically  to  firms  in  their  own 
region (each household supplying one unit) and choose consumption to maximise utility.  
In the coastal region, manufacturing firms choose employment and output to maximise 
profits, taking the real wage as a parameter and, in the interior, agricultural firms employ 
all labour and pay a wage equal to the average product of labour.  Governments are 
assumed to behave exogenously apart from the fact that they need to satisfy their budget 
constraint.  




                                                 
4 Although in the simulations we allow these shares to differ so that we can use them to model a fiscal 
transfer. 
5 While our structure drastically simplifies the structure of Chinese taxes, we would argue that it captures 
the salient features; see Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez (2003), Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005), Shen, Jin and 
Zou (2006), Jin and Zou (2005),  Tochkov (2007), Zhang and Zou (1998),  Zhang and Zou (2001) and 
Zhang (2006) for recent information on aspects of the Chinese public finances.  It should be also noted that 
the tax on agriculture was abolished in 2006.  We nevertheless include it in our model since for much of the 
postwar period it has been an important source of revenue for the interior provincial governments.  But it 
would be possible to replace it with an alternative that falls more heavily on the interior provinces and is an 
important source of revenue for them.  Indeed and ironically, our analysis will be useful to assess the likely 
effectiveness of the abolition of this tax in reducing the gap between the inland and the coast. 
6 A list of variables is given in Appendix 1.  
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2.1 Households 
Households  derive  utility  from the consumption  of the two  privately-produced 
goods as well as from a good supplied by governments.  We assume a representative 
household in each region and that the utility function for this household is of the constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) form:    
(1) 
1
( ) i i Ai Ai Mi Mi i i V C C GH
ρ ρ ρ ρ β γ γ δ
−
− − − = + + ,    i = I, C 
where  Vi  =  utility of the representative household, region i, 
  CAi  =  real private consumption of agricultural output per household, region i, 
  CMi =  real private consumption of manufactured good per household, region i, 
  GHi =  real government-provided consumption per household, region i. 
  βi   =   the scale parameter, region i, 
  γji,   =   the share parameters, region i, good j,  
  δi  =   the share parameter for the government consumption good, region i and 
  ρ  =   the substitution elasticity parameter (the elasticity of substitution is   
      1/(1+ρ)),   
with: 
  0 i β > ,       i = I, C, 
  0 < γji < 1,    j = A, M,   i = I, C, 
  0 < δi < 1,    i = I, C, 
  γAi + γMi + δi  = 1  i = I, C, and 
  ρ > -1. 
To formulate the household budget constraint we need to combine quantities of 
the two goods in a single measure.  We do this using the price of a composite good which  
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we will later also use to define national output and income as well as the government 
good which, in the case of the central government, will also include both regional goods.
7 
The (national) composite good has a price index:  
  PC = (PA)
λ(PM)
1-λ 
where Pj is the price of good j ( j = A,M) and λ is the share of agricultural output in total 
output.  
We assume that households “pay” the VAT which the central government collects 
at a  given  rate  TV.   Since there are no  intermediate  goods  in  the model,  the  VAT is 
equivalent to a tax on the value of final consumption and, since households spend all their 
income, it is also equivalent to an income tax.  We can model income, therefore, as net of 
the VAT and account for the tax when we define income below.  Using the price index 
for the composite good, the household budget constraint for region i can be written as:  
   (PACAi + PMCMi)/PC = Ji 
or, using the definition of PC and letting P denote the price of  agricultural goods in terms 
of manufacturing goods, P = PA/PM, as 
  P
1-λCAi +P
-λ CMi = Ji,      i = I, C 
where Ji = household income (net of VAT) in terms of the composite good in region i. 
Utility  maximisation  subject  to  the  household  budget  constraint  gives  the  demand 




















,               i = I, C, 
                                                 
7 An alternative is to use one of the two goods as numeraire.  But given the regional specialisation of 
production, the choice of numeraire will have important effects on the regional comparisons if relative 
prices change.   




















,                            i = I, C. 
Wages and profits are measured in terms of each firm’s own output so that, given our 
assumptions about valuation of Ji, we have the following relationship between income, 
the sources of income (wages and profits) and the VAT rate: 
(3a)  (1+Tv)JI = P
1-λ(ΠHI + WI) ,    
(3b)   (1+Tv)JC =P
-λ(ΠHC + WC) , 
where  ΠHi = profit distribution per household, region i, and 
  Wi = real wage income per household, region i. 
As  indicated  earlier,  inter-regional  migration  is  possible  in  the  long  run  but 
subject to migration restrictions (based on the household registration system, or hukou) 
which  we  model  as  increasing  the  costs  of  migration.
8   Moreover,  we  assume  that 
migration occurs only from the poor to the rich region and so avoid the discontinuities 
which results from two-way costly migration; see Mansoorian and Myers (1993) for an 
analysis of a model with such discontinuities and Woodland and Yashida (2006) for an 
approach similar to ours but applied to immigration from poor to rich countries.
9   
In  the  models  with  free  migration  it  is  customary  to  assume  that  migration 
occurs until utility is equalised across regions.  But under the hukou system, people will 
                                                 
8 See Cheng and Selden (1994) for a general description and history of the hukou system. There have been 
various analyses of the effects of the hukou system.  Apart from the analysis by Whalley and Zhang (2007) 
which we mentioned in the introductory section, they include Hertel and Zhai (2006) who analyse the 
hukou restrictions in the context of urban-rural inequality, Liu (2005) who uses individual record data to 
investigate the effects at the individual level and Poncet (2006) who uses data on inter-regional migration to 
consider the effects of a change in hukou over time on such flows. 
9 Other authors (such as Boadway and Flatters, 1982, Myers, 1990, Petchey, 1993, 1995, Petchey and 
Shapiro, 2000, Groenewold, Hagger and Madden, 2000, 2003, and Groenewold and Hagger, 2005, 2007)  
have avoided the discontinuity by assuming migration to be costless but this will not do in our case since 
we will model the hukou restrictions in terms of migration costs.  
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be worse off in the interior since they will have to incur costs to obtain hukou for the 














= >  
 
 
where Ni/Ai is the population density of region i with Ni being population and Ai being 
area and  µ can be thought of as the hukou parameter – the larger is µ the greater will be 
the  difference  in  utilities across the two  regions  (since the coastal  population  density 
exceeds that in the interior so that the term in brackets exceeds one).
10   The intuition is 
that the higher the population density the more resistant will the coastal region be to 
further migration from  the  interior  provinces.  We use population  density  rather  than 
population itself since the latter will depend on the number of provinces in a region and 
not capture the idea that it is the perceived capacity of the coastal region to absorb more 




We assume that the number of firms in each region is fixed.  The FA firms in the 
interior region engage in agriculture and the FM firms in the coastal region engage in 
manufacturing.  In each region, firms hire labour from households in their own region 
and  combine  it  with  a  fixed  factor  and  the  infrastructure  provided  by  the  regional 
government to produce output using constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology.  
                                                 
10 Note that later Ni  will be used to denote the number of households in region i.  Since we will assume that 
household size is the same for both regions, we can assume, without loss of generality, that household size 
is 1 and therefore use N to denote both the number of households and population and use “per capita” and 
“per household” interchangeably.  
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In the interior the fixed factor is called land and we assume that each firm (or 
farm in this case) is allocated the same amount of land of identical quality.  Workers are 
assumed to choose a farm on which to work so as to achieve the highest wage.  Firms, in 
turn, pay all workers the average product so that in equilibrium the average product of 
labour is equalised across all agricultural firms which requires that they are all of the 
same size.  We can therefore analyse a representative agricultural firm which has the 
following production function: 
( )
) (1 ( ) / ( ) , 0 , ,(1 ) 1
AL AL AG AG
A A A A A AL AG AL AG Y B LAND L F GRF
α α α α α α α α
− − = < − − <  
where BA is total factor productivity (TFP), LA is the total labour in agriculture (also the 
total population in the inland region),  FA represents the number of agricultural firms and 
GRFA represents regional government expenditure on infrastructure which benefits firms. 
Since we assume land to be an immobile factor in fixed supply, we can simplify and write:  
) (1 ( )
AL AG
A A D B LAND
α α − − =  
so that the production function becomes: 
( ) ( ) / , 0 , ,(1 ) 1
AL AG
A A A A A AL AG AL AG Y D GRF L F
α α α α α α = < − − <  
Hence  shocks  to  DA  can  be  interpreted  as  changes  in  available  agricultural  land  or 
changes in TFP.  This will prove to be a useful interpretation when we shock this variable 
in the course of our simulation exercises since in the Chinese context an increase in TFP 
may be easier to imagine than an increase in the quantity of agricultural land. 
We proceed along the same lines for firms in the coastal region which engage in 
manufacturing.  In this region the fixed factor is capital which is not inter-regionally 
mobile and, again, it is assumed to be distributed in equal amounts amongst the fixed 
number of manufacturing firms.  Since all firms maximise profits, they will be of the  
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same size and we can analyse the typical firm which has a production function of the 
form: 
( )
) (1 ( ) / ( ) , 0 , ,(1 ) 1
ML ML MG MG
M M M M M ML MG ML MG Y B CAPITAL L F GRF
α α α α α α α α
− − = < − − <
   




M D B CAPITAL
α α − − =    
so that  the production function for manufacturing becomes: 
( ) ( ) / , 0 , ,(1 ) 1
ML MG
M M M M M ML MG ML MG Y D GRF L F
α α α α α α = < − − <  
Again, DM can be interpreted as TFP as well as capital in manufacturing.  We can write 
the production functions for both regions as: 
(5)  ( ) ( ) / , 0 , ,(1 ) 1, ,
jL jG
j j j j j jL jG jL jG Y D GRF L F j A M
α α α α α α = < − − < =  
Consider now firms’ behaviour.  Profits (in terms of the firm’s own output) are 
defined as: 
(6)  ΠFj = (1-Tj)Yj – Wj(Lj/Fj),    j = A, M 
where TA is the tax on agricultural output levied by the government of the interior region 
and TM is the tax levied by the coastal region’s government on manufacturing output.
11 
We assume many firms in each industry so that each firm takes the wage, the tax rate and 
the quantity of infrastructure as given.  Hence the only choice variable in each case is the 
level  of  employment  (which  will  also  determine  output  via  the  production  function).  
Following a long tradition in the economic development literature (Lewis, 1954, Mellor 
                                                 
11 Note that given our simplifying assumptions, the VAT imposed in the coastal region is equivalent to the 
manufacturing tax (they are both effectively levied on the value of output) and the VAT imposed in the 
interior is equivalent to the tax on agriculture except that the implications via the budget constraints differ – 
the VAT has implications for both regions via the central government’s budget constraint while the 
manufacturing tax has implications only for the coastal region and the agricultural tax only for the interior.  
  17 
and Stevens, 1956, Gutman, 1957, Robinson, 1971, and Rey, 1998), we make different 
behavioural assumptions for the two sectors – manufacturing firms in the coastal region 
are  assumed  to  choose  employment  to  maximise  profits  but  in  the  inland  region  all 
workers are assumed to find employment in agriculture with the farm output being shared 
equally among all workers. In agriculture, therefore, the wage is equal to the average 
product and profits are zero.  
The profit-maximising condition for manufacturing firms will result in the usual 
marginal productivity condition: 
(7a)   ( )
1
(1- ) ( ) /
ML MG




In  agriculture  the  assumption  that  labour  is  paid  its  average  product  results  in  the 
following condition:   
(7b)  ( )
1
(1- ) ( ) /
AL AG
A A A A A A T D GRF L F W
α α −
=    
On the labour supply side, each household in each region is assumed to provide one unit 
of labour inelastically to the firms in its own region so that labour force, labour supply, 
employment and the number of households are all equal.   
 
2.3 Governments 
There are three sources of government revenue.  The central government levies a 
VAT  at  a  uniform  rate  across  the  country  and  shares  the  revenue  with  the  regional 
governments.    In  addition,  each  regional  government  has  its  own  tax:  the  coastal 
government  raises  revenue through  a  business  tax  on  manufacturing  industry  and  the 
inland  government  levies  an  agricultural  tax  on  the  value  of  farm  output.    Each 
government (central, coastal and interior) receives tax revenue in the form of output and  
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costlessly  transforms  this  output  into  a  homogeneous  government  good.    The  central 
government provides this to households as a consumption good in both regions, in per 
capita amounts which are the same for all households within the region but may differ 
across  regions.    Each  regional  government  provides  some  output  to  households  as  a 
consumption  good  (in  equal  per  capita  amounts)  within  its  own  region  as  well  as 
providing some to firms as infrastructure.  
There  are  no  assets  in  the  model  so  that  neither  households,  nor  firms  nor 
governments can lend or borrow.  Governments therefore must balance their budgets.  
Consider the central government first.  It raises VAT of NITVJI in region I and NCTVJC in 
region C.  Of this, a proportion (1-θ) is transferred to the regional governments and the 
remainder is transformed costlessly into the government consumption good.  In particular, 
we assume that one unit of the composite good can be transformed into a unit of the 
government  good.  The  central  government  receives  VAT  revenue  which  is  levied  on 
incomes  which  are  measured  in  terms  of  the  composite  good.    Its  budget  constraint 
therefore has the simple form so that each unit of revenue is transformed into a unit of the 
government good: 
(8)  NIGCI + NCGCC = θTV(NIJI+NCJC).     
where GCi (i=I,C) is government good per household provided to residents of region i, TV 
is the VAT rate and θ is the central government’s share of the VAT proceeds.   
The  regional  governments  receive  some  revenue  from  the  VAT  which  is 
measured  in  terms  of  the  composite  good  but  also  some  from  local  firms  which  is 
measured in terms of the firm’s own output and is therefore re-valued in terms of the  
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composite  good  before  being  transformed  into  the  government  good.    The  regional 
governments’ budget constraints have the form: 
 (9a)   NIGRHI + GRFA = FATAP
1-λ
 YA+(1-θ)TVNIJI   




2.4 Aggregate variables and closure 
It remains to introduce a number of important aggregate variables, definitions and 
market-clearing conditions to complete the specification of the model.   
  First, the aggregate counterparts to the regional disparity variables are defined. 
We begin with aggregate output.
12  Recall that output is measured per firm so that to 
compute national output we first compute regional output for each region, convert each 
region’s output to the composite good before adding them: 
(10)   Y = FAP
1-λYA + FMP
-λYM 
For income, we simply add total income (per capita income multiplied by population) of 
each region since they are already measured in terms of the composite good: 
(11)   J = NIJI + NCJC  
The appropriate procedure for welfare is less straightforward because of the problem of 
comparing  utilities.    We  overcome  this  at  the  regional  level  by  assuming  identical 
households but households may differ across regions so that the same procedure is not 
obviously correct.  We decide to treat all individuals equally and simply measure national 
                                                 
12 Note that in much of the development literature, national development is measured using per capita 
output or income.  In our model, national population will be assumed to be constant so that per capita 
output will always change equi-proportionately with aggregate output and similarly for income and welfare 
so that aggregate and per capita variables may be used interchangeably to measure national development.  
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welfare as the population-weighted average of the utilities of the two types of identical 
households:    
(12)  V = (NI/N)VI + (NC/N)VC. 
Next, we introduce a number of definitions.  First, the relationship between GHi 
and its components is given by:   
(13)  GHi = GRHi + GCi,    i = I, C 
Second,  as  a  matter  of definition,  wages  in  manufacturing  are  the  same  as  the  wage 
received per household in the coastal region and the agricultural wage is the same as the 
wage received by the representative interior household: 
(14a)   WI = WA  
(14b)  WC = WM 
Market-clearing conditions are imposed on goods and labour markets. Goods-
markets clearing in each region implies: 
(15a)  FAYA = NICAI + NCCAC + TAFAYA+TVNIP
λ-1JI,    
(15b)  FMYM = NICMI + NCCMC + TMFMYM + TVNCP
λJC 
where we use the fact that in each case income is measured in terms of the composite 
good while consumption and output  are measured in terms of output of agricultural and 
manufacturing goods.  The labour market in each region clears so that employment in 
agriculture is equal to the number of households in the interior region (each household 
supplying one unit of labour) and the employment level in manufacturing is equal to the 
number of coastal households: 
(16a)   LA = NI 
(16b)  LM = NC  
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Firms are assumed to distribute all their profits to households in their own region in equal 
per capita amounts:  
(17a)  FAΠFA = NIΠHI,     
(17b)  FMΠFM = NCΠHC   
The trade between regions must balance: 
(18)  NCPCAC = NICMI. 
Finally, there is a given national population, N, which we assume to be exogenous 
(19)  NI + NC = N 
To summarise, the model consists of the 33 equations, (1) to (19) in 44 variables: 
 Vi, Cji, GHi, P, Ji, ΠHi, Wi, Fj, Dj, Yj, Lj, Ni, ΠFj, TV, Tj, Wj, GRHi, GRFj, GCi, θ, N, µ, Y, J, 
and V,  
of which 13 are exogenous:  
Fj, Dj, Tj, one of (GRHI, GRFA), one of (GRHC, GRFM), one of (GCI, GCC), θ, TV, N, and 
µ,  
so that there are 31 endogenous variables:  
Vi, Cji, GHi, P, Ji, ΠHi, Wi, Yj, Lj, Ni, ΠFj, Wj, Y, J, V, one of (GRHI, GRFA), one of (GRHC, 
GRFM) and one of (GCI, GCC).
13    
Two  equations,  however,  are  redundant  since  (3),  (6),  (14),  (16),    (17),  (18)  and  the 
household  budget  constraint  can  be  used  to  derive  (15)  so  that  the  balance  between 
number of equations and number of endogenous variables is restored.  
                                                 
13 Note that which of (GRHI, GRFA), for example, is chosen to be exogenous may affect the simulation 
results.  In some cases the choice will be clear, such as when we wish to compute the effect of a change in 
GRHI in which case it must be the exogenous one.  When we have a choice, we choose GRFA, GRFM and 
GCC to be the exogenous variable in the three pairs in the list above.  We will comment on the effects of 
these choices in our discussion of the results.  Note also that, strictly-speaking we should include the two Aj 
as variables and declare them exogenous.  But since they are areas of the two regions and there seems no 
possible exercise which would require shocks to them, we treat them as parameters.  
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2.5 Short-run and long-run versions of the model 
In  the  simulations  to  be  reported  below  we  distinguish  between  short-run  and 
long-run  versions  of  the  model.    Since  the  model  is  static  rather  than  dynamic,  the 
distinction is not based on the notion of equilibrium but corresponds, as in many CGE 
models, to differences in closure assumptions.  In particular, we define the short run as 
the length of time before inter-regional migration begins to respond to the changes in VI 
and VC.  The distinction is based on the idea that migration is slow to respond fully to 
changes in economic incentives.  Thus, for example, Pissarides and McMaster (1990) 
estimate that it takes as long as 20 years for reasonably complete adjustment of migration 
to  labour-market  shocks.    In  terms  of  the  model,  this  simply  involves  suspending 
equations (4) and (19) and making NI and NC  exogenous in the simulation. The long run 
is used to refer to the simulation results using the model as set out above.   
 
2.6 Linearising the model 
The  model  as  it  stands  is  too  complicated  to  solve  analytically  so  that  we 
linearise  it  in  terms  of  proportional  changes  for  which  we  use  a  process  of  log 
differentiation.  This  converts the model from one which is non-linear in the levels to one 
which  is  linear  in  the  proportional  rates  of  change  of  the  variables.    The  resulting 
linearised versions of equations (1)-(19) are given in Appendix 2. 
2.7 The numerical version of the linearised model 
Having linearised the model in terms of proportional changes, we can solve the 
model for any one of the (changes in the)  endogenous variables in terms of (the changes  
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in) the exogenous variables.  However, given the number of endogenous variables, this is 
unlikely  to  lead  to  any  interpretable  results  and  we  proceed  to  solve  the  model 
numerically using data for China’s regions to calibrate the key parameters of the model, 
detailed discussion of which we relegate to Appendix 3. 
 
3. The Simulations 
Given the number of exogenous variables in the model, there are many possible 
policies which might affect the regional distribution of output. We simulate four such 
policy actions, which the interior government and central government might undertake to 
reduce  regional  disparities  and  assess  the  effects  on  the  disparities  themselves  and 
examine whether there is a trade-off between the reduction of disparities and national 
development.    We  examine  three  alternative  disparity  measures  (output,  income  and  
welfare) and their corresponding aggregate levels to assess the nature of the trade-off.  
We consider two policies carried out by the regional government.  They are:  
(i)  A  regional  government  fiscal  policy.    The  model  structure  provides  various 
possible balanced-budget fiscal policy combinations.  We choose an increase in 
interior government-provided consumption aimed at increasing both welfare and 
expenditure and hence output via the usual multiplier effects in the region.  We 
assume  that  the  interior  government’s  budget  is  balanced  by  changing  the 
provision of infrastructure.  Alternatives involve the use of changes in taxation to 
balance the regional government’s budget constraint and we comment briefly on 
these as appropriate.   
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(ii)  Measures which increase productive capacity in the agriculture sector, such as 
releasing more land for agriculture or improving agricultural technology   It might 
be argued that there is little additional land available for release to agriculture in 
China.  However, the shock here may also be thought of as the implementation of 
policy which halts or slows down the alienation of farm land for non-agricultural 
purposes. 
 
Policies which the central government might undertake to reduce disparities are: 
(iii) A cut in hukou cost which makes migration from the interior to the coast cheaper.  
We note that originally the hukou system was instituted and administered by the 
central  government  but  that  since  reforms  began  in  the  late  1970s  it  has 
increasingly been the wealthier coastal provinces which have maintained the force 
of the hukou restrictions, presumably to keep out low-wage workers from the poor 
inland  provinces.    Coastal  provinces  are,  therefore,  hardly  likely  to  undertake 
reform  or  allow  relaxation  of  the  migration  restrictions  to  benefit  the  poorer 
inland provinces and it must be assumed that only the central government is likely 
to apply pressure to reduce restrictions which make it costly for labour to move 
from the interior provinces to the more prosperous coastal region.  
(iv) A  fiscal  redistribution  in  the  form  of  an  increase  in  expenditure  on  the 
consumption good in the interior region by the central government balanced by a 
reduction in that in the coastal region to balance the government’s budget.  An 
alternative version of this policy is to change the VAT-sharing arrangements in 
favour of the interior.  Given the simple model structure, this turns out to have the  
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same  qualitative  effects  as  the  expenditure  change  and  we  do  not  consider  it 
separately. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Base case 
A summary of the base case simulation results are included in Table 1.  Detailed 
results for all variables are reported in Appendix 4. We discuss the four policies in turn. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Policy 1: An interior government fiscal policy  
Table 1 shows that policy 1 has the desired effect of reducing the income and welfare 
gaps but that it increases the output per capita disparity in both the short and long runs. 
Moreover, while there is a reduction in the income and welfare gaps, this is obtained at 
the expense of a reduction in national welfare, income and output.  Thus, in both short 
and long runs, there is a trade-off when the measure of interest is income or welfare while 
if policy targets output per capita, there is a deterioration in both the gap and the national 
level.  
  The  mechanism  underlying  these  results  is  that  the  increase  in  government-
provided  consumption  expenditure  in  the  interior  region  requires  a  decrease  in 
expenditure on government-provided infrastructure if the government is to maintain its 
budgetary balance.  The decrease in infrastructure reduces both output and per capita 
output in the interior, the direct result of which is an increase in the output per capita gap 
and a decrease in national output. The effect in the interior spills over into the coastal 
region  via  relative  price  changes  and  inter-regional  trade.  The  fall  in  interior  output  
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increases agricultural prices relative to manufacturing prices. This results in a increase in 
income in the interior region and a decrease in income in the coastal region (both of 
which are valued in terms of composite good).  These income changes reinforce the direct 
effects of the policy of reducing the welfare gap between the interior and coastal regions. 
For the country as a whole, the increases in income and welfare in the interior region are 
not large enough to offset the corresponding decreases in the coastal region, so that the 
reduction of the income and welfare gaps comes at the expense of lower income and 
welfare nationally.  
In the long run, the improvement in welfare in the interior relative to that in the 
coast induces migration from the coast to the interior. This causes a fall in the output in 
the coastal region and a further fall in output for the nation as a whole and partly reverses 
the original increase in the relative price of agricultural goods and so partly reverses the 
original  effects  on the welfare and  income  gaps.    Indeed,  welfare and  income  in  the 
interior both fall by a small amount in the long run.
14  However,  these long-run changes 
are not large enough to reverse the direction of policy effects on the gaps: the income and 
welfare gaps still decrease in the long run (although not by as much as in the short run) 
and the gap in output per capita still increases while at the national level income, welfare 
and output all fall in the long run. 
                                                 
14 Note that output in the interior falls further in the long run even though there is migration from the coast 
to the interior.  The full results for this case reported in the Appendix show that this is largely a government 
budget effect: as noted in the text, in modelling the present policy shock, we assume that infrastructure 
expenditure is the endogenous variable in the regional government’s budget constraint. An influx of 
population requires the interior government to increase consumption expenditure to maintain this at the new 
higher level, requiring a further fall in the level of infrastructure expenditure which reduces interior output 
by more than enough to offset the beneficial effects of the increase in labour input.  
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There is therefore a trade-off in the income and welfare dimensions in both the 
short and  long  runs  and  no  trade-off in  terms  of  output  (in  the  sense that  the  policy 
worsens both the per capita output gap and national output). 
As mentioned in the previous section, alternative forms of regional government 
fiscal  policy  are  possible.    An  expansion  of  infrastructure  spending  balanced  by  a 
reduction in the amount of the consumption good  provided will, not surprisingly, have 
the opposite effect of the policy just described – it will boost national levels of output, 
income and welfare and reduce the per capita output gap but all this comes at the cost of 
widening  income  and  welfare  gaps.    Alternatively,  increases  in  expenditure  can  be 
balanced  by  a  rise  in  the  agricultural  tax.    These  alternatives  will  have  effects  not 
dissimilar to those just described with the dominant effect working through the change in 
infrastructure spending.   
In summary, regional government fiscal policy generally faces a trade-off in the 
income and welfare dimensions but not in the output dimension.   
 
Policy 2: An increase in agricultural productive capacity 
Table 1 indicates that policy 2 is clearly effective in reducing the regional per 
capita output gap and that it is also beneficial for national output growth both in the short 
run  and long  run  since the  boost to  agricultural  productive  capacity  greatly  increases 
agricultural output in the interior region while leaving manufacturing output unchanged 
in the short run and reducing it slightly in the long run.  Thus, on the output front, there is 
no  trade-off  between  tackling  inter-regional  disparities  and  maintaining  the  level  of 
aggregate activity.   
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The increase in agricultural output, however, adversely affects its relative price 
which means that income in the interior region actually decreases while that in the coastal 
region increases, which worsens the income gap between the two regions. But the income 
fall in the interior region is smaller than the increase in the coast so that national income 
increases.  Similarly, welfare in the interior falls while that in the coast increases so the 
welfare gap increases but national welfare also increases since the fall in the interior is 
more than offset by the change in the opposite direction in the coast.  Thus, as with 
regional  government  fiscal  policy,  there  is  a  trade-off  when  the  government  targets 
welfare or income.   
  In the long run, the utility difference induces migration from the interior region to 
the coast,  which  increases  income  in the interior  (resulting  both from the  increase in 
wages and profits in the interior region and from the relative price change which is now 
in favour of the agricultural good) and welfare in the interior but not by enough to reverse 
the short-run adverse effects on the welfare and income gaps although national income 
and  welfare continue to improve.  Thus in the long run welfare, income and output all 
increase in both regions but output per capita falls in the coastal region due to a modest 
movement  of  population  to  the  coast  which  increases  output  but,  with  decreasing 
marginal product of labour, reduces output per capita.  Despite the generally beneficial 
effects on both regions, the inter-regional welfare and income gaps both widen (while 
difference between output per capita in the two regions narrows).  As with regional fiscal 
policy, there is a trade-off between equality and national development in the income and 
welfare dimensions but not as far as output is concerned. 
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Policy 3: A relaxation of the hukou restrictions 
  Table 1 shows that policy 3 has no effects in the short run which is not surprising 
since the internal migration channel through which it operates is closed in the short run. 
However, in the long run the hukou relaxation induces substantial migration from the 
interior to the coastal region, which reduces the output in the interior while increasing 
both the coastal output and national output. Given declining marginal productivity of 
labour, the fall in output in the interior is less than the fall in labour inputs so that per 
capita output increases in the interior region. For the same reason, per capita output in the 
coastal region is falls. Therefore, policy 3 unambiguously narrows the regional per capita 
output gap.  It also increases national output since the coastal expansion more than offsets 
the interior contraction.  There is therefore no trade-off in the output dimension. 
  Policy 3 is also helpful in reducing the regional income and welfare gaps in the 
long run. The mechanism is that the outflow of labour from the interior region improves 
wages and profits in the interior region and the reduction in output in the interior region 
has  a  relative  price  effect  in  favour  of  the  agricultural  good,  both  of  which  serve  to 
increase income in the interior. The increase in income in the interior has positive effects 
on welfare in this region, which also benefits from the outflow of labour since this results 
in an increase of the government-provided consumption good (both because of the rise in 
the per capita tax base and an increase in the tax revenue from the VAT). On the contrary, 
the inflow of migration into the coastal region is harmful for the utility and income of the 
representative household in this region. However, since the decrease in income and utility 
in the coastal region is smaller than the increase in the interior region, national income  
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and welfare both increase so that the government avoids a trade-off in the income and 
welfare dimensions.  
  Thus, policy 3 is the first of the three policies considered so far for which there is 
not  trade-off  for  any  of  the  three  variables  considered:  income,  welfare  and  output.  
However,  while  appearing  beneficial  in  all  dimensions,  the  coastal  region  becomes 
worse-off (per capita output, welfare and income all fall), making it likely that the coastal 
government(s) will strongly oppose relaxation of migration restrictions. 
 
Policy 4: A fiscal redistribution by the central government 
  As stated in the previous section, the structure of the model allows us to define at 
least two fiscal redistribution policies, one an expansion of expenditure in the interior 
matched  by  a  reduction  in  the  coast  and  the  other  a  change  in  the  VAT-sharing 
arrangements in favour of the interior.  Both have qualitatively similar effects and we 
focus on the first – a rise in the provision of the government consumption good to the 
interior with the central government’s budget being balanced by a fall in the provision of 
the good to the coastal residents. 
  Table 1 shows that policy 4 has short-run effects only on welfare. Its effects on 
the welfare in the interior is positive while its effect on the welfare in the coastal region is 
negative which simply reflects the redistribution from the coast to the interior.  Although 
the coastal utility loss is smaller than the interior’s utility gain, national welfare falls 
because of the greater coastal population.  
  Over time, people move from the coast to the interior in response to the welfare 
gap.  The  inflow  of  labour  into  the  interior  increases  the  output  in  this  region  and  
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decreases that in the coastal region also decreasing national output.  As in previous cases, 
per capita output moves in the opposite direction so that the regional per capita output 
gap increases. Relative prices move against agriculture which has a negative effect on 
income in the interior region and also on national income. The inflow of migration into 
the  interior  region  also  reduces  the  short-run  welfare  benefits  to  that  region  and  so 
mitigates the short-run policy effects of reducing the regional welfare gap.  
  Therefore, policy 4 has some benefits in reducing the regional welfare gap but it 
enlarges the regional income and per capita output gaps and reduces national income, 
welfare and output.  The central government therefore faces a trade-off in the welfare 
dimension in both the short and long runs but no trade-off in the output and income 
dimensions.  
 
4.2 Sensitivity to calibration of the substitution elasticity  
In  CGE  modelling  in  general  the  elasticity  of  substitution  is  an  important 
parameter and, moreover, it is difficult to calibrate (see, e.g., Mansur and Whalley, 1984).  
In  our  analysis  we  use a CES  utility  function  so  that the elasticity  of substitution  in 
consumption  between  the  agricultural  and  manufacturing  goods  is  potentially  an 
important parameter in the model since it is likely to influence relative price changes 
which  have  featured  centrally  in  our  explanation  of  the  effects  of  policy  shocks, 
particularly  the effects on  income.   As  pointed  out  in  Appendix  3,  in calibrating  the 
model  we  use  an  average  value  of  others’  econometric  estimates  of  the  substitution 
elasticity. To assess the sensitivity of the results reported above to this choice, we re-ran  
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the simulations with the low and high values for the substitution elasticity.  Our base-case 
results use a value of 0.44 and Appendix 5 reports results for values of 0.2 and 0.68. 
As expected, the value of substitution elasticity does have some effects on the 
results, particularly on the income effects which, in turn, affect utility and, in the long run, 
output though the channel of migration. The results reported in Appendix 5 show that the 
smaller the value of the substitution elasticity, the larger the effect of policy shocks on 
income. The mechanism is that the smaller the substitution elasticity, the more difficult is 
substitution between agricultural goods and manufacturing goods and so the larger the 
relative price change, which affects income in both regions. However, the direction of 
change  in  disparities  (income,  welfare  and  per  capita  output)  and  of  the  change  in 
national  variables  (output,  income  and  welfare)  are  not  affected  by  the  different 
elasticities experimented with so our main conclusions regarding the existence of trade-
off are not undermined. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The focus of this paper is the tension between reducing inter-regional disparities 
and  maintaining  the  level  of  aggregate activity  –  is  there a  cost in  terms  of  national 
development foregone when policies to reduce inter-regional gaps are implemented? Our 
starting  point  was  that  both  regional-  and  national-level  variables  are  likely  to  be 
endogenous in any satisfactory regionally-disaggregated macro model so that whether an 
inter-regional gap and the corresponding national variable move together or in opposite 
directions will, in general, depend on the shock imposed on the model.  
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To explore this issue, we built a small two-region model capturing some of the 
characteristics of the Chinese economy and subjected it to a number of shocks of which 
we described four in detail. The effects of these shocks on inter-regional gaps in per 
capita output, income and welfare as well as on the corresponding national levels of these 
variables were analysed using simulations of a numerical version of the model.   
Given that the signs of the effects of policy shocks are of most relevance for the 
question at hand, we summarise these signs in Table 2. We consider three gaps: in per 
capita output, income and welfare as well as the aggregate counterparts to these variables.  
Two broad conclusions may be drawn from the information in the table. 
[Table 2 about here] 
First, different gaps generally move in different directions so that policy-makers 
need to be clear as to which gap is being targeted.  For the two policies initiated by the 
regional  government  the  welfare  and  income  gaps  move  together  but  in  the  opposite 
direction to the gap in per capita output.  For the central government redistribution policy 
it is  the   gaps in  per capita  output and  income  which  move  together  in  the  opposite 
direction to welfare.  Finally, only in the policy which  reduces inter-regional migration 
costs, do all three gaps move in the same direction.   
Second, whether a narrowing of the gap between the interior and the coast comes 
at the expense of the national level of the relevant variable depends also on the shock. In 
particular, regional government fiscal and productivity policies face a trade-off in both 
welfare and income dimensions, central government redistribution policy faces a trade-
off in the welfare dimension only and while the hukou policy alone faces no trade-off at 
all.  
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In summary, whether a trade-off exists generally depends on both the variable of 
interest and on the nature of the policy shock.  Fiscal redistribution policies always face a 
trade-off in at least one dimension and often in two.  Only a reduction of the costs of 
internal migration reduces the inter-regional disparities for all three variables considered 
– income, welfare and per capita output – and does so while increasing the national level 
of these variables, thus producing both inert-regional and national benefits.  But even this 
policy comes at a cost – the coastal region loses in terms of welfare, income, and output 
per capita and can, on the basis of these results, be expected to continue to oppose a 
relaxation of the restrictions on internal migration in China.     
  
  35 
References 
Alesina,  A.  and  D.  Rodrik  (1994),  “Distributive  Politics  and  Economic  Growth”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 465-490.   
Bao,  S.,  G.  H.  Chang,  J.  D.  Sachs  and  W.  T.  Woo  (2002)  “Geographic  Factors  and 
China's  Regional  Development  under  Market  Reforms,  1978–1998”,  China 
Economic Review, 13, 89-111. 
Barro, Robert J. (2000), “Inequality and Growth in A Panel of Countries”, Journal of 
Economic Growth, 5, 87-120. 
Barro,  Robert  J.  (2008),  “Inequality  and  Growth  Revised”,  Asian  Development  Bank 
Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No.11. 
Benabou, R.(1996), “Inequality and Growth”, In: Bernanke, Ben S., Rotemberg, Julio J. 
(Eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Manual, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Benhabib,  J.  and  A.  Rustichini  (1996),  “Social  Conflict  and  Growth”,  Journal  of 
Economic Growth, 1, 129–146. 
Boadway, R. and Flatters, F. (1982), “Efficiency and Equalisation Payments in a Federal 
System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results”, Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 15, 613-633. 
Bjornskov,  C.  (2008),  “The  Growth-Inequality  Association:  Government  Ideology 
Matters”, Journal of Development Economics, 87, 300-308.  
Brun, J.F., J. L. Combes and M. F. Renard (2002), “Are there Spillover Effects between 
the Coastal and Noncoastal Regions in China?”, China Economic Review, 13,. 
161-169. 
Chambers, D. (2007), “Trading Places: Does Past Growth Impact Inequality?”, Journal of 
Development Economics, 82,  257-266.    
Chang, J. Y. and Ram, R. (2000), “Level of Development, Rate of Economic Growth and 
Income Inequality”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48(4), 787-799.  
Cheng, T. and Selden, M. (1994), “The Origins and Consequences of China’s Hukou 
System”, The China Quarterly, 139, 644-668. 
Demurger,  S.  (2001),  “Infrastructure  Development  and  Economic  Growth:  An 
Explanation  for  Regional  Disparities  in  China?”,  Journal  of  Comparative 
Economics, 29, 95-117. 
Easterly, W. (2007), “Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: Insights from a New 
Instrument”, Journal of Development Economics, 84, 755-776. 
Edin, P. A. and Topel, R. (1997), “Wage Policy and Restructuring: the Swedish Labor 
Market  since  1960”,  in  Freeman  ,  R.B.,  Topel,  R.,  Swedenborg,  B.(eds),  The 
Welfare  State  in  Transition,  Reforming  the  Swedish  Model,  University  of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp155-201. 
Fallah,  B.  and  Partridge,  M.  (2007),  “The  Elusive  Inequality-Economic  Growth 
Relationship: Are There differences between Cities and the countryside?”, Annals 
of Regional Science, 41, 375-400. 
Fan, S. (1991), “Effects of Technological Change and Institutional Reform on Production 
Growth in Chinese Agriculture”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 73, 
266-275.  
  36 
Fleisher, B. M and J. Chen (1997), “The Coast-Noncoast Income Gap, Productivity and 
Regional  Economic  Policy  in  China”, Journal  of Comparative  Economics,  25, 
220-236. 
Forbes, Kristin J. (2000), “A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and 
Growth”, American Economic Review, 90, 869–887. 
Fujita, M. and Hu, D. (2001), “Regional disparity in China 1985-1994: The effects of 
globalization and liberalization”,  Annals of Regional Science, 35, 3-37. 
Galor, O. and J., Zeira (1993), “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics”, Review of 
Economic Studies, 60, 35-52. 
Golley, J. (2007), The Dynamics of Chinese Regional Development: Market Nature, State 
Nurture, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, UK. 
Groenewold,  N.,  A  Chen  and  G.  Lee  (2008),  Linkages  between  China’s  Regions: 
Measurement and Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
Groenewold, N. and Hagger, A. J. (2005), “The Effects of an Inter-Regional Transfer 
with Empire-Building Regional Governments”, Review of Regional Studies, 35, 
38-63.  
Groenewold, N. and Hagger, A. J. (2007), “The Effects of Fiscal Equalisation in a Model 
with  Endogenous  Regional  Governments:  An  Analysis  in  a  Two-Region 
Numerical Model”, Annals of Regional Science, 41, 353-374.  
Groenewold, N.,  Hagger, A. J. and Madden, J. R. (2000), “Competitive Federalism: A 
Political-Economy  General  Equilibrium  Approach”,  Australasian  Journal  of 
Regional Science, 6, 451-465. 
Groenewold, N., Hagger, A. J. and Madden, J. R. (2003), “Interregional Transfers: A 
Political-Economy CGE Approach”, Papers in Regional Science, 82,  535-554. 
Gutman,  G.  O.  (1957),  "A  Note  on  Economic  Development  with  Subsistence 
Agriculture", Oxford Economic Papers, 9, 323-334. 
He, C., Wei, Y. D. and X. Xie (2008), ‘Globalization, Institutional Change, and Industrial 
Location: Economic Transition and Industrial Concentration in China’, Regional 
Studies, 42, 923-945. 
Hertel, T. and Zhai, F. (2006), “Labour Market Distortions, Rural-Urban Inequality and 
the Opening of China’s Economy”, Economic Modelling, 23, 76-109. 
Hirschman,  A.  (1958),  The  Strategy  of  Economic  Development,  New  Haven:  Yale 
University Press. 
Hu,  D.(2002),  “Trade,  Rural–Urban  Migration,  and  Regional  Income  Disparity  in 
Developing Countries: A Spatial General Equilibrium Model Inspired by the Case 
of China”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 32, 311–338. 
Jin,  H.,  Qian,  Y.  and  Weingast,  B.  R.  (2005),  “Regional  Decentralization  and  Fiscal 
Incentives: Federalism Chinese Style”, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1719-
1742.   
Jin,  J.  and  H.  Zou  (2005),  “  Fiscal  Decentralization,  Revenue  and  Expenditure 
Assignments and Growth in China”, Journal of Asian Economics, 16, 1047-1064. 
Kaldor, N., 1956, “Alternative Theories of Distribution”, Review of Economic Studies,23, 
83-100. 
Kuijs, L. and T. Wang (2005), "China's Pattern of Growth: Moving to Sustainibility and 
Reducing Inequality", World Bank China Research Paper, No.2.  
  37 
Kuznets,  S.  (1955),  “Economic  Growth  and  Income  Inequality”,  American  Economic 
Review, 45, 1-28. 
Lewis,  W.  A.  (1954),  “Economic  Development  with  Unlimited  Supplies  of  Labour”, 
Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 22, 139-191. 
Li, C. (2009), “Savings, Investment and Capital Mobility within China”, China Economic 
Review, doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2009.08.005. 
Li, S. and J., He (2006), “China’s Economic Development Prospects (2006-2020)”, paper 
presented at the ACE International Conference in Hong Kong. 
Liu,  Z.  (2005),  “Institution  and  Inequality:  The  Hukou  System  in  China”,  Journal  of 
Comparative Economics, 33, 133-157. 
Lundberg,  M.  and  L.  Squire  (2003),  “The  Simultaneous  Evolution  of  Growth  and 
Inequality”, Economic Journal, 113, 326-344. 
Mansoorian, A.  and Myers, G.M.(1993), “Attachment to Home and Efficient Purchases 
of Population in a Fiscal Externality Economy”, Journal of Public Economics, 52, 
117–132. 
Mansur, A., Whalley, J.(1984), “Numerical Specification of Applied General Equilibrium 
Models: Estimation, Calibration and Data”, in Scarf, H.E. and Shoven, J.B. (eds.) 
Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Mellor, J. W. and Stevens, R. D. (1956), “The Average and Marginal Product of Farm 
Labor in Underdeveloped Economies”, Journal of Farm Economics, 38, 780-791. 
Myers,  G.  M.  (1990),  “Optimality,  Free  Mobility  and  the  Regional  Authority  in  a 
Federation”, Journal of Public Economics, 43, 107-121. 
Myrdal, G. (1957), Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, London: Duckworth. 
Partridge,  M.(2005), “Does  Income  Distribution effect  US  State  Economic  Growth?”, 
Journal of Regional Science, 45, 363-394. 
Persson, T. and G., Tabellini (1994), “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?”, American 
Economic Review, 84, 600-621. 
Petchey, J. (1993), “Equalisation in a Federal Economy with Inter-State Migration and 
Different Factor Endowments”, Australian Economic Papers, 32, 343-353. 
Petchey,  J.  (1995),  “Resource  Rents,  Cost  Differences  and  Fiscal  Equalization”, 
Economic Record, 71, 343-353. 
Petchey, J. and Shapiro, P. (2000), “The Efficiency of State Taxes on Mobile Labour 
Income”, Economic Record, 76, 285-296. 
Pissarides, C.A. and I. McMaster (1990), “Regional Migration, Wages and Unemployment: 
Empirical Evidence and Implications for Policy”, Oxford Economic Papers, 42, 812-
831. 
Poncet,  S.  (2006),  “Provincial  Migration  Dynamics  in  China:  Borders,  Costs  and 
Economic Motivations”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36, 385-398. 
Qiao, B, Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Xu, Y. (2008), “The Trade-off Between Growth and 
Equity in Decentralisation Policy: China’s Experience”, Journal of Development 
Economics, 86, 112-128.   
Rey, D. (1998), Development Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Robinson,  W.  C.  (1971),  “The  Economics  of  Work  Sharing  in  Peasant  Agriculture”, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 20, 131-141.  
  38 
Shen, C., Jin, J. and Zou, H. (2006), “Fiscal Decentralization in China: History, Impacts, 
Challenges and Next Steps”, World Bank Discussion Paper. 
State Statistical Bureau (2005), China Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook 2005, Statistical 
Publishing House of China, Beijing. 
State  Statistical Bureau (2007), China  Statistical  Abstract  2007,  Statistical  Publishing 
House of China, Beijing. 
State  Statistical  Bureau  (various  issues),  Statistical  Yearbook  of  China,  Statistical 
Publishing House of China, Beijing. 
Tochkov,  K.  (2007),  “Interregional  Transfers  and  the  Smoothing  of  Provincial 
Expenditure in China”, China Economic Review, 18, 54-65. 
Wan G., M. Lu and Z. Chen (2006), “The Inequality–Growth Nexus In the Short and 
Long Run: Empirical Evidence from China”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 
34, 654-667. 
Whalley, J. and Zhang, S. (2007), “A Numerical Simulation Analysis of (Hukou) Labour 
Mobility Restrictions in China”, Journal of Development Economics, 83, 392-410. 
Williamson, J. (1965), “Regional Inequality in the Process of National Development”, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 17, 3-84. 
Woodland, A.D. and Yoshida, C.(2006),“Risk Preference, Immigration Policy and Illegal 
Immigration”, Journal of Development Economics, 81, 500– 513. 
Zhang, T. and Zou, H. (1998), “Fiscal Decentralization, Public Spending and Economic 
Growth in China”, Journal of Public Economics, 67, 221-240. 
Zhang,  X.  (2006),  “Fiscal  Decentralization  and  Political  Centralization  in  China: 
Implications for Growth and Inequality”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 34, 
713-726. 
Zhang,  Y.  and  Zou,  H.  (2001),  “The  Growth  Impact  of  Intersectoral  and 
Intergovernmental Allocation of Public Expenditure: With Applications to China 
and India”, China Economic Review, 12, 58-81. 
Zhang,  Z.  and  Martinez-Vazquez,  J.  (2003),  “The  System  of  Equalizing  Transfers  in 
China”,  International  Studies  Program  Working  Paper  03-12,  Andrew  Young 
School  of  Policy  Studies,  Georgia  StateUniversity.  
  39 
Table 1 Summary of Base Case Simulation Results 
Policy 1  Policy 2  Policy 3  Policy 4 
Variables 
SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
vI  0.0778   -0.0476   -0.1574   0.2567   0.0000   0.5256   0.1619   0.0611  
vC  -0.2483   -0.2181   1.0246   0.7293   0.0000   -0.3747   -0.1296   -0.0580  
v  -0.1737   -0.2383   0.7544   0.7854   0.0000   0.0393   -0.0630   -0.0722  
jI  0.1179   -0.0242   -0.4864   0.0079   0.0000   0.6274   0.0000   -0.1246  
jC  -0.2716   -0.2288   1.1209   0.7707   0.0000   -0.4444   0.0000   0.0883  
j  -0.0983   -0.1601   0.4059   0.4933   0.0000   0.1109   0.0000   -0.0220  
yA  -0.2423   -0.2987   1.0000   0.9499   0.0000   -0.0636   0.0000   0.0126  
yM  0.0000   -0.0654   0.0000   0.1813   0.0000   0.2301   0.0000   -0.0457  
y  -0.1042   -0.1657   0.4299   0.5117   0.0000   0.1038   0.0000   -0.0206  
lA  0.0000   0.0723   0.0000   -0.2005   0.0000   -0.2544   0.0000   0.0505  
lM  0.0000   -0.0982   0.0000   0.2721   0.0000   0.3453   0.0000   -0.0686  
p  0.6317   0.6084   -2.6073   -2.0039   0.0000   0.7657   0.0000   -0.1521  
yA-lA  -0.2423   -0.3711   1.0000   1.1504   0.0000   0.1908   0.0000   -0.0379  
yM-lM  0.0000   0.0328   0.0000   -0.0908   0.0000   -0.1152   0.0000   0.0229  
Notes: since yj and lj are log differences of output and population respectively, yj-lj is the log difference of 
output per capita.  Policy 1 has grhi =  1 and grfj endogenous; policy 2 has dj =1 and grhi endogenous, 





Table 2: Summary of results 
Policy 1  Policy 2  Policy 3  Policy 4 
Variables 
SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
welfare gap  -  -  +  +  0  -  -  - 
income gap  -  -  +  +  0  -  0  + 
Pc output gap  +  +  -  -  0  -  0  + 
aggregate welfare  -  -  +  +  0  +  -  - 
aggregate income  -  -  +  +  0  +  0  - 
aggregate output  -  -  +  +  0  +  0  - 
Note: .  Policy 1 has grhi =  1 and grfj endogenous; policy 2 has dj =1 and grhi endogenous, policy 3 has µi 
= 1 and  grhi endogenous, policy 4 has gcI  = 1 and gcC endogenous. 
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Figure 1 The two regions of mainland China  
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 Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
Vi = utility of the representative household, region i, 
V = national welfare, 
CAi = real private consumption of agricultural output per household, region i, 
CMi = real private consumption of manufactured good per household, region i, 
GHi = real government-provided consumption per household, region i. 
P = price of agricultural good in terms of manufactured good 
Ji = real household income (net of VAT), region i, 
J = national income, 
ΠHi = real profit distribution per household, region i 
Wi = real wage income per household, region i 
Fj = the number of firms, sector j 
Dj = productivity parameter, sector j 
Yj = real output, sector j 
Y = national output, 
Lj = employment, sector j 
Ni = population, region i 
ΠFj = firm profit, sector j 
Tv = value added tax rate 
Tj = output tax rate, sector j 
Wj = real wage income, sector j 
GRHi = real regional government-provided consumption good per household, region i 
GRFi = real regional government-provided public good, region i 
GCi = real central government-provided consumption good per household in region i 
θ = share of valued tax to the central government 
N = national population 
µ = hukou parameter 
 
Appendix 2: Linearised version of the model 
The model of section 2 is linearised in terms of proportional differences by taking 
logarithms and differentials of each equation.  The linearised form of equations (1) to (19) 
(excluding equations (15) which are redundant) of the model are as follows, with the 
linearised form having the same number as the original equation but being distinguished 
by a prime.  
The linearised utility function is: 
(1’)    i caiv Ai cmiv Mi ghiv i v c c gh σ σ σ = + +                           i=I, C 
where  lower-case  letters  represent  the  proportional  changes  (log  differential)  of  their 
upper-case counterparts and  
Ai Ai
caiv





































− − − =
+ +
.  
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The linearised consumption demand functions are: 



























(2b’)   Mi i cai c j p p λ σ = + −                                i=I, C. 
  The linearised definitions of real household income are: 

















































  The linearised migration equilibrium condition corresponding to equation (4) is: 
(4’)   
/
* log( ) ( )
/
C C
C I C I
I I
N A
v v n n
N A
µ µ µ = + + −   
where  µ* = dµ/µ and we have used the obvious assumption that area is constant. 
  The linearised production functions are: 
(5’)    ( ) j j jG j jL j j y d grf l f α α = + + −                      j=A, M. 
  The linearised profit definitions are given by: 































  The manufacturing sector’s profit-maximisation condition in linear form is: 
(7a’)   (1 )( ) 0 M tM M M MG M ML M M w t d grf l f σ α α + − − + − − =   
and that for agriculture is given by: 
(7b’)   (1 )( ) 0 A tA A A AG A AL A A w t d grf l f σ α α + − − + − − = . 
  The central government’s budget constraint is linearised as: 
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, θ* = dθ/θ.   
  The regional government’s budget constraint in linear form is given by: 
(9a’)   ( ) grhIgr I I grfAgr A n grh grf σ σ + +  
         ( ) ( * ) tAgr A A A tvIgr V I I f t p p y t n j θ σ λ σ σ θ = + + − + + − + + +   
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(9b’)   ( ) grhCgr C C grfMgr M n grh grf σ σ + +  
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The definition of national output is linearised as: 

















 and we assume that  yyA λ σ = . 
The definition of national income is linearised as: 
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The definition of national welfare is linearised as: 
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The definition of GHi is linearised as: 













σ = . 
  The equalities between interior and agricultural wage and between coastal and 
manufacturing wage imply: 
(14a’)   I A w w = , 
(14b’)   C M w w = . 
Equations  (15),  the  goods  markets  clearing  conditions,  are  dropped  from  the 
model due to the redundancy result explained in section 2. 
The employment market clearing conditions imply: 
(16a’)   A I l n = , 
(16b’)   M C l n = . 
The profit distribution conditions can be linearised to give: 
(17a’)   A A I I f f n h π π + = + , 
(17b’)   M M C C f f n h π π + = +  . 
    The balance of trade condition in linear form is:  
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(18’)    C AC I MI n p c n c + + = + . 
  The national employment constraint results in the following linearised condition: 
(19’)    nI I nC C n n n σ σ + =  
where  / , / nI I nC C N N N N σ σ = = . 
 
Appendix 3: Calibrating the linearised model 
The linearised model contains a number of parameters which have to be evaluated 
before the model can be put to work to simulate the effects of various shocks. These 
parameters  fall  into  two  groups.  The  first  are  parameters  which  appear  in  model 
relationships; γji, δi and ρ appear in the utility function (1) and αjG and αjL appear in the 
production function (5). The remainder, on the other hand, are linearisation parameters 
which are all shares of some sort. 
The model parameters were evaluated as follows.  For the parameters of the utility 
function we broadly followed the method set out in Mansur and Whalley (1984) in which 













where   i η  is the (uncompensated) own-price elasticity, values for which were derived as 
averages from Table 4 in Mansur and Whalley, and  i
σ γ  can be derived from ratios of 
consumption expenditure and our assumption that γAi + γMi + δi  = 1. 
  The manufacturing sector production parameters, αMG and αM. were calibrated as 
follows. Using the firm’s first-order condition for profit-maximisation, equation (7a), and 
the assumption that the firm can choose the government expenditure to maximize profit, 






















and use data for the wage bill, government infrastructure expenditure and manufacturing 
output net of tax to compute the parameters. 
Since we assume that firms in the interior region (the agricultural sector) pay all 
workers the average product rather than their marginal product, we can not use the profit-
maximisation condition to derive production parameters for agricultural sector.  Instead, 
we rely on previous work which has estimated agricultural production functions of the 
Cobb-Douglas type from which we obtain parameter values.  In particular, we use a value 
of 0.25  for the labour parameter (αAL) and 0.35 for the land parameter (1- αAL - αGL), 
based on values reported in Fan (1991) and use the constant-returns-to-scale assumption 
to derive a value of 0.4 for the government expenditure parameter (αGL).  
The  linearisation  parameters  can  be  evaluated  directly  from  their  definitions, 
given values for P, θ, µ, IIHi, Wi, Tv, Tj, Yj, ΠFj, Lj, Ni, GCi, Ji, GRHi, GRFi, GHi, Fj and 
Ni.  We normalise P at unity and also set the immigration parameter, µ, at unity (although 
we ran experiments with different values for µ);  θ is set at 0.75 to reflect the current 
division of VAT revenue between the central and regional governments.  We then use  
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these assumed values and the data for Ci, GRHi, GRFj, GCi, Ni, Wi together with the  
model definitions to calculate the value of all other variables.  The use of the model 
definitions ensures that the parameter values used in the simulations are consistent with 
the model constraints. 
We  therefore  need  data  for  two  regions,  the  interior  and  the  coast,  for  the 
variables  Ci,  GRHi,  GRFj,  GCi,  Ni,  Wi.   The  data  we  use  are  based  on  those for the 
Chinese provinces which we have allocated to the two regions as follows. The coastal 
region  consists  of  Beijing,  Tianjin,  Hebei,  Guangdong,  Hainan,  Shandong,  Fujian, 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Liaoning and Guangxi with the remaining provinces being 
allocated to the interior region.  The interior therefore consist of: Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, 
Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, 
Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang.   A map of the two regions 
is provided in Figure 1. 
For each region we use data averaged over the seven-year period 2000-2006 to 
avoid  cyclical  influences  on  the  share  parameters.    All  the  data  come  from  China 
Statistics  Year  Book  (SSB,  various  issues)  except  for  data  on  area  used  to  compute 
population density for the migration equilibrium condition, equation (4’), which come 
from China Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook 2005 (SSB, 2005).  
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Appendix 4 Base Case Results 
Policy 1:  Policy 2:  Policy 3:  Policy 4: 
  grhi=1 
 
dA = 1  µ = -1  gcI = 1 
Variables  LR  LR  SR  LR  LR  LR  SR  LR 
vI  0.0778   -0.0476   -0.1574   0.2567   0.0000   0.5256   0.1619   0.0611  
vC  -0.2483   -0.2181   1.0246   0.7293   0.0000   -0.3747   -0.1296   -0.0580  
v  -0.1737   -0.2383   0.7544   0.7854   0.0000   0.0393   -0.0630   -0.0722  
cAI  -0.0657   -0.2010   0.2712   0.5902   0.0000   0.4049   0.0000   -0.0804  
cMI  0.2123   0.0667   -0.8761   -0.2915   0.0000   0.7418   0.0000   -0.1473  
cAC  -0.4195   -0.3712   1.7313   1.2398   0.0000   -0.6237   0.0000   0.1239  
cMC  -0.1415   -0.1035   0.5840   0.3581   0.0000   -0.2867   0.0000   0.0570  
ghI  0.0952   0.0242   0.3667   0.6447   0.0000   0.3528   0.7508   0.6972  
ghC  -0.2322   -0.2452   0.9583   0.7964   0.0000   -0.2055   -0.5986   -0.5709  
jI  0.1179   -0.0242   -0.4864   0.0079   0.0000   0.6274   0.0000   -0.1246  
jC  -0.2716   -0.2288   1.1209   0.7707   0.0000   -0.4444   0.0000   0.0883  
j  -0.0983   -0.1601   0.4059   0.4933   0.0000   0.1109   0.0000   -0.0220  
πhI 
 
-0.2423   -0.3711   1.0000   1.1504   0.0000   0.1908   0.0000   -0.0379  
πhC 
 
0.0000   0.0328   0.0000   -0.0908   0.0000   -0.1152   0.0000   0.0229  
wI  -0.2423   -0.3711   1.0000   1.1504   0.0000   0.1908   0.0000   -0.0379  
wC  0.0000   0.0328   0.0000   -0.0908   0.0000   -0.1152   0.0000   0.0229  
yA  -0.2423   -0.2987   1.0000   0.9499   0.0000   -0.0636   0.0000   0.0126  
yM  0.0000   -0.0654   0.0000   0.1813   0.0000   0.2301   0.0000   -0.0457  
y  -0.1042   -0.1657   0.4299   0.5117   0.0000   0.1038   0.0000   -0.0206  
lA  0.0000   0.0723   0.0000   -0.2005   0.0000   -0.2544   0.0000   0.0505  
lM  0.0000   -0.0982   0.0000   0.2721   0.0000   0.3453   0.0000   -0.0686  
nI  0.0000   0.0723   0.0000   -0.2005   0.0000   -0.2544   0.0000   0.0505  
nC  0.0000   -0.0982   0.0000   0.2721   0.0000   0.3453   0.0000   -0.0686  
πfA  -0.2423   -0.2987   1.0000   0.9499   0.0000   -0.0636   0.0000   0.0126  
πfM  0.0000   -0.0654   0.0000   0.1813   0.0000   0.2301   0.0000   -0.0457  
wA  -0.2423   -0.3711   1.0000   1.1504   0.0000   0.1908   0.0000   -0.0379  
wM  0.0000   0.0328   0.0000   -0.0908   0.0000   -0.1152   0.0000   0.0229  
p  0.6317   0.6084   -2.6073   -2.0039   0.0000   0.7657   0.0000   -0.1521  
grhI  1.0000   1.0000   -1.0795   -0.2268   0.0000   1.0820   0.0000   -0.2149  
grfA  -0.6057   -0.7920   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
grhC  -0.6640   -0.7012   2.7404   2.2773   0.0000   -0.5876   0.0000   0.1167  
grfM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
gcI  -0.2052   -0.2997   0.8468   0.9340   0.0000   0.1106   1.0000   1.0000  
gcC  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   -0.9205   -0.9407  
fA  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
fM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
dA  0.0000   0.0000   1.0000   1.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
dM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
tA  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
tM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
qI  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
qC  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
tV  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.5256   0.1619   0.0611  
n  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   -0.3747   -0.1296   -0.0580  
μ  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0393   -0.0630   -0.0722   
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Appendix 5: Sensitivity Results (sigma=0.20) 
Policy 1:  Policy 2:  Policy 3:  Policy 4: 
  grhi=1 
 
dA = 1  µ = -1  gcI = 1 
Variables  LR  LR  LR  LR  LR  LR  SR  LR 
vI  0.2627   0.0448   -2.8391   -0.1130   0.0000   0.6668   0.1619   0.0329  
vC  -0.2881   -0.2360   3.2930   1.1320   0.0000   -0.5286   -0.1296   -0.0273  
v  -0.1622   -0.2693   1.8914   1.2797   0.0000   -0.1496   -0.0630   -0.0345  
cAI  0.2053   -0.0341   -2.3464   0.0901   0.0000   0.5960   0.0000   -0.1177  
cMI  0.3519   0.1036   -4.0224   -0.5641   0.0000   0.8459   0.0000   -0.1671  
cAC  -0.3812   -0.3041   4.3576   1.4616   0.0000   -0.7084   0.0000   0.1399  
cMC  -0.2346   -0.1664   2.6816   0.8074   0.0000   -0.4584   0.0000   0.0906  
ghI  0.2055   0.0818   -1.5887   0.3359   0.0000   0.4708   0.7508   0.6701  
ghC  -0.2695   -0.2886   3.0798   1.3597   0.0000   -0.4208   -0.5986   -0.5253  
jI  0.3305   0.0835   -3.7773   -0.4684   0.0000   0.8094   0.0000   -0.1599  
jC  -0.3152   -0.2420   3.6026   1.1669   0.0000   -0.5958   0.0000   0.1177  
j  -0.0280   -0.1340   0.3196   0.6024   0.0000   0.0692   0.0000   -0.0137  
πhI 
 
-0.0875   -0.3090   1.0000   1.3962   0.0000   0.0969   0.0000   -0.0191  
πhC 
 
0.0000   0.0539   0.0000   -0.2392   0.0000   -0.0585   0.0000   0.0116  
wI  -0.0875   -0.3090   1.0000   1.3962   0.0000   0.0969   0.0000   -0.0191  
wC  0.0000   0.0539   0.0000   -0.2392   0.0000   -0.0585   0.0000   0.0116  
yA  -0.0875   -0.1899   1.0000   0.8680   0.0000   -0.0323   0.0000   0.0064  
yM  0.0000   -0.1077   0.0000   0.4777   0.0000   0.1168   0.0000   -0.0231  
y  -0.0376   -0.1431   0.4299   0.6454   0.0000   0.0527   0.0000   -0.0104  
lA  0.0000   0.1191   0.0000   -0.5282   0.0000   -0.1292   0.0000   0.0255  
lM  0.0000   -0.1617   0.0000   0.7168   0.0000   0.1753   0.0000   -0.0346  
nI  0.0000   0.1191   0.0000   -0.5282   0.0000   -0.1292   0.0000   0.0255  
nC  0.0000   -0.1617   0.0000   0.7168   0.0000   0.1753   0.0000   -0.0346  
πfA  -0.0875   -0.1899   1.0000   0.8680   0.0000   -0.0323   0.0000   0.0064  
πfM  0.0000   -0.1077   0.0000   0.4777   0.0000   0.1168   0.0000   -0.0231  
wA  -0.0875   -0.3090   1.0000   1.3962   0.0000   0.0969   0.0000   -0.0191  
wM  0.0000   0.0539   0.0000   -0.2392   0.0000   -0.0585   0.0000   0.0116  
p  0.7331   0.6885   -8.3799   -3.2707   0.0000   1.2498   0.0000   -0.2469  
grhI  1.0000   1.0000   -8.3824   -1.6835   0.0000   1.6386   0.0000   -0.3237  
grfA  -0.2187   -0.5492   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
grhC  -0.7705   -0.8253   8.8075   3.8885   0.0000   -1.2033   0.0000   0.2377  
grfM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
gcI  -0.0583   -0.2230   0.6668   1.0063   0.0000   0.0830   1.0000   1.0000  
gcC  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   -0.9205   -0.9356  
fA  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
fM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
dA  0.0000   0.0000   1.0000   1.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
dM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
tA  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
tM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
qI  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
qC  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
tV  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
n  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
μ  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   -1.0000   -1.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
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Appendix 5: Sensitivity Results (sigma=0.68) 
Policy 1:  Policy 2:  Policy 3:  Policy 4: 
  grhi=1 
 
dA = 1  µ = -1  gcI = 1 
Variables  LR  LR  LR  LR  LR  LR  SR  LR 
vI  -0.0621   -0.1208   0.3367   0.4201   0.0000   0.4631   0.1619   0.0737  
vC  -0.2181   -0.2039   0.6067   0.5515   0.0000   -0.3068   -0.1296   -0.0717  
v  -0.1824   -0.2138   0.5450   0.5671   0.0000   0.1227   -0.0630   -0.0889  
cAI  -0.2708   -0.3331   0.7534   0.8111   0.0000   0.3205   0.0000   -0.0638  
cMI  0.1066   0.0375   -0.2964   -0.1712   0.0000   0.6958   0.0000   -0.1385  
cAC  -0.4484   -0.4244   1.2474   1.1419   0.0000   -0.5862   0.0000   0.1167  
cMC  -0.0710   -0.0538   0.1976   0.1597   0.0000   -0.2109   0.0000   0.0420  
ghI  0.0118   -0.0214   0.7270   0.7811   0.0000   0.3006   0.7508   0.7093  
ghC  -0.2040   -0.2108   0.5674   0.5475   0.0000   -0.1104   -0.5986   -0.5912  
jI  -0.0431   -0.1095   0.1199   0.2183   0.0000   0.5470   0.0000   -0.1089  
jC  -0.2386   -0.2183   0.6637   0.5958   0.0000   -0.3776   0.0000   0.0752  
j  -0.1516   -0.1808   0.4218   0.4451   0.0000   0.1293   0.0000   -0.0257  
πhI 
 
-0.3595   -0.4202   1.0000   1.0418   0.0000   0.2323   0.0000   -0.0463  
πhC 
 
0.0000   0.0160   0.0000   -0.0253   0.0000   -0.1403   0.0000   0.0279  
wI  -0.3595   -0.4202   1.0000   1.0418   0.0000   0.2323   0.0000   -0.0463  
wC  0.0000   0.0160   0.0000   -0.0253   0.0000   -0.1403   0.0000   0.0279  
yA  -0.3595   -0.3849   1.0000   0.9861   0.0000   -0.0774   0.0000   0.0154  
yM  0.0000   -0.0319   0.0000   0.0504   0.0000   0.2801   0.0000   -0.0558  
y  -0.1545   -0.1837   0.4299   0.4527   0.0000   0.1264   0.0000   -0.0252  
lA  0.0000   0.0353   0.0000   -0.0558   0.0000   -0.3097   0.0000   0.0617  
lM  0.0000   -0.0479   0.0000   0.0757   0.0000   0.4203   0.0000   -0.0837  
nI  0.0000   0.0353   0.0000   -0.0558   0.0000   -0.3097   0.0000   0.0617  
nC  0.0000   -0.0479   0.0000   0.0757   0.0000   0.4203   0.0000   -0.0837  
πfA  -0.3595   -0.3849   1.0000   0.9861   0.0000   -0.0774   0.0000   0.0154  
πfM  0.0000   -0.0319   0.0000   0.0504   0.0000   0.2801   0.0000   -0.0558  
wA  -0.3595   -0.4202   1.0000   1.0418   0.0000   0.2323   0.0000   -0.0463  
wM  0.0000   0.0160   0.0000   -0.0253   0.0000   -0.1403   0.0000   0.0279  
p  0.5550   0.5450   -1.5439   -1.4445   0.0000   0.5520   0.0000   -0.1099  
grhI  1.0000   1.0000   0.2660   0.4165   0.0000   0.8362   0.0000   -0.1665  
grfA  -0.8987   -0.9843   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
grhC  -0.5833   -0.6029   1.6226   1.5658   0.0000   -0.3157   0.0000   0.0629  
grfM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
gcI  -0.3163   -0.3605   0.8800   0.9021   0.0000   0.1228   1.0000   1.0000  
gcC  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   -0.9205   -0.9430  
fA  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
fM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
dA  0.0000   0.0000   1.0000   1.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
dM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
tA  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
tM  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
qI  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
qC  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
tV  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
n  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
μ  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   -1.0000   -1.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
 